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Comments
Rights of the Surviving Spouse Under the
Pennsylvania Wills and Estates Statutes
INTRODUCTION
The rights of the surviving spouse in the estate of his deceased mate
are governed by three statutes in Pennsylvania. The first of these is sec-
tion 2 of the Intestate Act' which sets forth the intestate share. Then
there is section 11 of the Estates Act 2 which allows a surviving spouse
to treat as testamentary certain inter vivos conveyances. Finally, section
8 of the Wills Act 3 provides the right to take against the will. It is the
purpose of this paper to examine the latter two sections in light of how
the Pennsylvania courts have applied them.4
Before dealing with specific applications of these two statutes, a brief
explanation of their general effect would be helpful. Essentially section
8 assures the surviving spouse that the decedent may not exclude him
from sharing in decedent's estate by devising or bequeathing it to others.
If the surviving spouse does not agree with the testamentary scheme, he
may take against the will and receive a statutory share of the property
which his spouse owned at death. Section 11 allows a surviving spouse to
treat as testamentary certain inter vivos conveyances where the donor,
the decedent, had retained certain controls.
Under both of these sections the surviving spouse must elect to take
against all transfers of which he is a beneficiary if he elects to take against
any.5 He may not take under a will that treats him favorably and at the
same time take against an inter vivos conveyance. Nor, on the other
1. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 80, § 2, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.2
(Supp. 1970).
2. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
3. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89 § 8, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8
(Supp. 1970).
4. For the tax and fiduciary considerations in this area see Shaiman, The Widow's
Election-Tax and Fiduciary Considerations, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1966)
5. See Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, § 8, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 180.8 (Supp. 1970), and Act of April 24, 1947 P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
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hand, may he take against an unfavorable will and not take against an
inter vivos conveyance falling within the purview of section 11. 6
SEcriON 1 1
In Pennsylvania, before the enactment of section 11, when legal title
had passed prior to death, the surviving spouse could not share in this
property.7 The only exception to this rule was made in the case of fraud.8
It had been decided that the intent to deprive one's spouse of his dis-
tributive share did not constitute a fraudulent intent.9 The court in
Rynier Estate set forth an accurate statement of these propositions.
Decedent had a perfect right to give away all or any of her prop-
erty, and if she actually divested herself of ownership and there
was no fraud. . .. it is immaterial that her husband was thereby
deprived at her death of his distributive share in her estate. 10
It was in this setting that section 11 was enacted."' It provides that,
where certain incidents of ownership are retained, the surviving spouse
may treat the conveyance as testamentary. A statutory share is provided
the surviving spouse in the event that he makes that election. The inci-
dents of ownership that must be retained are " a power of appointment
by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the princi-
pal . . ."1 This provision is consistent with the philosophy exhibited
by the law in other states.18 It also reflects the policy of our own state,
Pennsylvania, toward the surviving spouse.' 4 Incidentally, while the
6. This was not so before the addition of this limitation in the statute. Shaiman, supra
note 4, at 7. "This requirement is to prevent the electing spouse from picking and choosing
the conveyance against which she will take."
7. Some historical background in this area may be found in Woods, Wills and Admin-
istration, 1955-1956 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 344 (1957).
8. Windolph v. Girard Trust Company, 245 Pa. 349, 91 A. 634 (1914).
9. Id. at 364, 91 A. at 638; Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa.
570, 578, 161 A. 721, 723 (1932). Br gy states the rule as follows: "Hence, a practical work-
ing rule under the case law as it stood prior to this act was that the motive of the donor
was irrelevant in determining whether an inter vivos gift of personalty was in fraud of
marital rights." BRacY, PENNSYLVANIA INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcTS OF 1947 5855
(1949); Bookstaves, Estates and Trusts, 1960-1961 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 23 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 409, 428-29 (1961).
10. 347 Pa. 471, 474, 32 A.2d 736, 738 (1943).
11. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
12. Id. "This section preserves for the surviving spouse the right to share the decedent's
assets were the decedent has retained important rights of ownership at death." Commis-
sion's Comment to section 11.
13. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937); Smith v. Northern Trust Co.,
322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944).
14. Behan Estate, 399 Pa. 314, 160 A. 2d 209 (1960). See Woods, Wills and Administra-
231
Duquesne Law Review
statements of policy usually speak in terms of preserving widows'
rights, 15 it is clear both from the rules of statutory construction 16 and
from decisions that the statute also applies to the rights of widowers. 17
The act has been held not to be retroactive in effect. I8 The rationale
for this result is that vested rights should not be destroyed. The vested
rights in those cases were the rights of the donees to whom the decedent
gave property subject to the decedent's power.19
Since the act is not applied retroactively, the time of the conveyance
must always be considered in determining the rights of a surviving
spouse. In analyzing a particular situation, several determinations must
be made in order to resolve the general question of whether section 11
applies. First, there must be a "conveyance of assets. ' '20 Secondly, the
conveyance must have occurred after January 1, 1948, the effective date
of the statute.2' Finally, it must be determined whether the decedent
retained a power that would fall within the act. It is within this frame-
work that the courts have dealt with section 11 problems.
One major area, in which it was predictable that section 11 would
have great effect, was the revocable trust.2 Prior to 1948, a conveyance
that vested a present interest was not rendered testamentary merely
because the settlor reserved a beneficial life estate and a power to re-
voke.2 This was true both as to its general testamentary character as
well as to its testamentary character in relation to a surviving spouse.
However, the reservation of the additional power to control the admin-
istration of the trust was held to render the conveyance generally tes-
tamentary as to those dispositions intended to take effect after death. 24
tion, 1959-1960 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 22 U. Prrr. L. REv. 297 (1960) for a discussion
of Behan.
15. Pengelly Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A. 2d 844 (1953).
16. Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, Art. III. § 33, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 533
(1969).
17. Graham Estate, 3 D. & C. 2d 218 (1954).
18. McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A. 2d 447 (1951).
19. Id.
20. The Estates Act defines a conveyance. "'Conveyance' means an act by which it is
intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended to
have inter vivos or testamentary operation. Except as used in section 11, it shall include an
act by which a power of appointment, whenever given, is exercised." Act of April 24, 1947,
P.L. 100 § 1, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.1 (Supp. 1970).
21. The effective date was January 1, 1948. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 21, PUR-
DON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.21 (1950).
22. The nature and uses of the revocable trust are dealt with in Williams, Revocable
Trusts in Estate Planning, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 524 (1959); ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 57-58.6 (1967).
23. Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSS
§ 57 (1959); SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (1967).
24. Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 227 (1946); Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa. 544, 190
A. 906 (1937); Pengelly Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A. 2d 844 (1953); see SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.1
(1967); But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1957).
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This was on the theory that the trustee merely became the agent of the
settlor.25 Prior to the enactment of section 11, it appears that no situa-
tion existed in which a conveyance would have been considered tes-
tamentary as to the spouse, and inter vivos as to all others merely on the
basis of retained powers as under the present statute.
After January 1, 1948,26 the courts recognized the consistency between
the new statute and state policy.27 In allowing a revocable trust to be
treated as testamentary relative to the wife the court stated the reason
for the law.
Wives were being very unfairly deprived of a share in their hus-
band's personal property by a transparent trust device which per-
mitted a husband to retain control of his property, and at the same
time legally deprive his wife of her just marital rights therein. 28
Retention of control has been maintained through use of the power
to withdraw principal.29 It was pointed out in Shapley Trust that a
"power to consume" is probably equivalent to a "power to revoke."30
A surviving spouse may or may not be able to treat as testamentary a
conveyance meeting section 11 requirements as to retained powers,
depending upon whether the conveyance was made before or after the
effective date. If a conveyance is made after the act's effective date the
law applies.3 1 If it occurs before this time and vested rights are created
the conveyance is not affected by the statute. Of course, a particular
conveyance could still be treated as generally testamentary. In that case
the effective date of section 11 would be immaterial.
The statute specifically designates "a power of appointment by will" 32
as one of the indicia of ownership that if retained will allow a surviving
spouse to elect to treat a conveyance as testamentary. It is to be noted
that no distinction is made between general powers 3 and special
powers.3 4 A prominent commentator suggests that an inequitable result
25. Id. Some Current Problems in Pennsylvania Law, 99 U.PA.REv. 814, 881 (1951) the
author states "that the agency test fails to meet the real issues created by these trusts."
26. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 21, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.21 (1950).
27. Behan Estate, 399 P. 314, 160 A. 2d 209 (1960).
28. Id. at 318, 160 A. 2d at 213.
29. Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A.2d 227 (1946).
30. Id.
31. McKean Estate, 366, Pa. 192, 77 A. 2d 447 (1951).
•32. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
33. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 17.2 (1967) defines a general power as "a power to appoint to any-
one whom the donee may select, whether the power is to appoint either by deed or by will,
or by deed alone or by will alone."
34. Id. A special power is defined as "a power to appoint only to or among the members
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would be obtained by not utilizing the distinctions that exist between
general powers and special powers.3 5 He states that "where there is a
life estate to settlor and remainder to issue the spouse is barred."3 16 He
compares that situation to one in which an "imperative" power
3 7
exists and the beneficiaries are a small class. He concludes that the two
conveyances, in practical effect, are so similar that perhaps not to treat
them similarly would be inequitable. In a later supplement he cited
Behan Estate to illustrate that "the court did not balk at applying the
act to a case involving a very limited special power."3
The tentative trust,39 otherwise known as the Totten Trust,40 also
falls within the purview of this section, because of its revocable nature.
In the absence of evidence of a different intention of the depositor,
the mere fact that a deposit is made in a savings bank in the name
of the depositor "as trustee" for another person is sufficient to show
an intention to create a revocable trust.4 '
Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine in Scanlon's Estate.42 By definition
the Totten Trust may be revoked at will until the depositor dies or
completes the gift. Also, it may be revoked by a contrary provision in a
will.43 The applicability of section 11 to this type of conveyance seems
obvious.
Certain problems regarding the effective date of the statute occurred
with the Totten Trust. Regarding the revocable trust, it has been argued
successfully that the beneficiaries had vested interests that could not be
destroyed.44 As to the tentative trust the vested rights argument does
not apply. The court in Graham Estate45states the rule as follows:
In a tentative trust, however, the beneficiary has no vested rights
of a limited class of persons." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320 (1940) also provides a
definition.
35. BR cY, supra note 9, at 5862.
36. Id. at 5863.
37. Id. at 5213; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 27 (1959).
38. BPtGY, supra note 9, at 8142.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
40. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment a at 156 (1959).
42. 313 Pa. 424, 169 A. 106 (1933); See Haskell, Testamentary Trustee as Insurance Ben-
eficiary; An Estate Planning Gimmick, 41 N.Y.U.L.REv. 566, 570 (1966). "They are effective
with respect to deposits made in savings banks, and in savings and loan institutions, but
whether they can be created in the form of an ordinary checking account is not clear.
"Bookstaver, Estates " Trusts, 1956-1965 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 27 U.Pirr. L.REv.
373, 389 (1966).
43. Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 A. 106 (1933).
.44. McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192; 77 A. 2d 447 (1951); Some Current Problems in Penn-
sylvania Law, supra note 25, at 864 treats problems of retroactivity.
45. Graham Estate, 3 D. & C. 2d 218 (1954).
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prior to the death of the depositor, and the reserved power of con-
trol by the depositor is complete and he likewise retains full power
follows that the arrangement is testamelntary in character .. .4
The court occasionally seems to have spoken in terms of common law
testamentary character.47 Dictum in lafolla Estate"s agreed with the
result in Graham Estate.49 Whenever the exact issue arises it seems
certain that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will deal with the
problem similarly.
In Longacre v. Hornblower0 a lower court held that the incident of
a joint tenancy5' that allows either tenant to sever the tenancy is in
effect a power of revocation over one half of the property involved and
that this conveyance comes under section 11.52
There are a number of other instances in which this section has been
applied. The number is limited only by the variety of conveyances in
which a donor may retain certain powers designated in the statute. The
section has been applied to a pension plan 53 in which the power to re-
voke the beneficiary, as well as other powers, including the power to
withdraw all funds upon termination of employment, were retained.
The court held:
The statute clearly states that this section comes into play when-
ever the decedent had the power to consume the assets in the fund.
In this case it is definite that the decedent had such power. It there-
fore appears that these contributions made by the decedent into
this pension fund comes under the terminology of this section of
the Estates Act.54
Section 11 also has been applied to an annuity contract. 55 There the
decedent had retained the power to appoint by will, the power to revoke,
46. Id. at 223.
47. Black Estate, 73 D. & C. 86 (1950).
48. 380 Pa. 391, 110 A. 2d 380 (1955).
49. 3 D. & C. 2d 218 (1954).
50. Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks, 83 D. & C. 259 (1952).
51. Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 A. 497 (1925) held that a joint tenancy existed
where a single estate in property was created with two or more persons as owners under
an express agreement.
52. Orth Estate, 18 Fid. Rep. 26, 30 (1967) held: "Since a tenancy by the entireties can-
not be severed unilaterally during life, it follows that the present account is not within
Sec. 11."
53. Blair Estate, 17 Fid. Rep. 231 (1967).
54. Id. at 237.
55. "An annuity is usually defined as being an obligation to pay a stated sum, usually
annually, to a stated recipient, such payments to terminate upon the death of the desig-
nated beneficiary. However, in a refund annuity contract if the annuitant dies before the
principal and interest has been paid out in income to him, the unused principal is re-
funded to the designated beneficiary or to the estate of the annuitant. 1 J. APPLEMAN &
J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 81 (1965).
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and the power to consume. 6 The unpaid balance was to be paid at his
death to the named beneficiaries. The argument was made that the
contracts were exempt under the insurance clause of section 11.51 The
court listed the many instances in which annuity contracts and insurance
contracts had been treated differently in this state. After comparing the
agreements involved the court merely stated that the contracts were not
insurance contracts so as to be excepted under section 11.51 The court
reasoned that if the legislature had intended to except annuity contracts
from the ambit of section 11 it would have provided a specific exemp-
tion.
Exemptions
There are several conveyances of assets that are excluded from section
11 effect notwithstanding the retention by decedent of one or more
indicia of ownership specified in the statute. One such exclusion is the
life insurance contract. While it is now clear that insurance contracts
are exempt it was not always so. It took two amendments to the 1947
statute to accomplish this clarification.59
Before any amendment was made regarding life insurance the law
was set forth in Brown Estate.60 The Brown court stated that an insur-
ance trust in which the settlor retained the powers to amend and revoke,
among other powers, was generally testamentary. It should be noted
that this court did not decide how "insurance held outright by the
insured would be treated."61
Two amendments changed the law as stated in the Brown decision.
Section 8 of the Estates Act6 states that the designation of insurance
56. Fitzgerald Estate, 42 D. & C. 2d 676 (1967).
57. Section 11 was amended in 1956. The following language exempts life insurance
contracts. "The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any contract of life in-
surance purchased by a decedent, whether payable in trust or otherwise." Act of April 24,
1947. P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 801.11 (Supp. 1970).
58. Fitzgerald Estate 42, D. & C. 2d 676, 682 (1967).
59. Act of July 11, 1957, P.L. 792, § 1, PUanON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7a (Supp.
1970) made it certain that the designation of beneficiaries of life insurance was not to be
considered testamentary. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1970). Haskell, supra note 42, at 574 states an unfavor-
able opinion of the legislation. "Recent legislation validating the designation of the trustee
under the insured's will as a life insurance policy beneficiary, and thereby excluding the
proceeds from the probate estate may be another step in the wrong direction."' Atkinson,
Succession, 35 N.Y.U.L.REV. 470, 474 (1960), "Ordinary life insurance is part of the estate
for estate tax purposes; why should it not be made so for purposes of the spouse's elective
share?"
60. Brown Estate, 4 D. & C. 2d 722 (1955), affd mem., 384 Pa. 99 (1956).
61. Id. at 726.
62. Act of July 11, 1957, P.L. 792, § 1, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7a (Supp.
1970).
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beneficiaries is not testamentary. The surviving spouse was precluded
from treating insurance contracts as testamentary by the addition to
section 11 of the following sentence: "The provisions of this subsection
shall not apply to any contract of life insurance purchased by a decedent,
whether payable in trust or otherwise."63 These two additions to the
Estates Act were construed in Henderson Estate.6 4 The court ruled,
after interpreting the new amendments, that neither insurance paid
directly, nor in trust, was testamentary as to anyone.65
It has been held that a surviving spouse is not entitled to any interest
in United States Savings bonds series "E" when the registered owner, the
the decedent, designated beneficiaries, but retained the power to re-
voke.68 This was a holding of Graham Estate. The decision was based
upon the federal pre-emption doctrine.6 7
The Treasury Regulations provided that bonds may be registered in
the name of one person payable to another at the owner's death.68 In
the event that the owner did not cash the bond the regulations stated
who was to be the owner. The regulations declared that "the beneficiary
will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond."6 9 In
addition, another regulation provided that judicial proceedings de-
feating the survivorship rights of such a beneficiary would not be rec-
ognized.70 The court held the Pennsylvania law subservient to the
federal law. One court stated the principle as follows:
Whenever the constitutional powers of the United States Govern-
ment and those of a state conflict, the latter must yield and such
cession takes place when the Federal Government, acting within
its constitutional authority, promulgates a rule as to the ownership
of evidences of the Government's indebtedness.71
Inter vivos gifts72 by their very nature are excluded from the op-
eration of section 11. Since an inter vivos gift to be valid must vest
present title irrevocably in the donee, section 11 cannot apply; the
63. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PurDoN's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
64. 395 Pa. 215, 149 A. 2d 892 (1959).
65. See Woods, Will and Administration, 1958-1959 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 21
U.Prrr. L.REv. 299, 302 (1959) where the state of the law is capsulized.
66. Graham Estate, 3 D. &. C. 2d 218 (1954).
67. Id. at 221.
68. 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1970).
69. Id. § 315.67.
70. Id. § 315.20.
71. Horstman Estate, 398 Pa. 506, 514, 159 A. 2d 514, 518 (1960).
72. Yeager's Estate, 273 Pa. 359, 362, 117 A. 67, 68 (1922) held: "To establish agift inter
vivos ... two essential elements must be made to appear: an intention to make the dona-
tion then and there, and an actual or constructive delivery at the same time, of a nature
sufficient to divest the giver of all dominion, and invest the recipient therewith."
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donor retains no "strings." However, this is not so with a gift causa
mortis.
Unlike the inter vivos gift, the gift causa mortis73 is revocable. It is
revoked upon the recovery of the donor. He may also revoke it before
death if he so desires. Although no case law has dealt specifically with
this issue in Pennsylvania, it seems that it should fall within the scope
of section 11.
A fourth method of avoiding section 11 has been noted and analyzed
by Br6gy.7 4 He suggests that a note payable at death could be used for
this purpose. If such an approach is successful the surviving spouse may
be excluded. He notes that the court in Rynier Estate75 held that such
a note must be paid. Nevertheless, another court ruling was offered as
a possible vehicle for at least softening the blow. Hummel's Estate,76
which asserted that the spouse's share in the estate must be measured
before the note was paid was offered to serve that end. No appellate
court has yet ruled on the specific question.
An antenuptial"7 or post nuptial agreement 8 can provide a means of
avoiding section 11 for those who have no other means. The statute
and related case law offer a number of exceptions, but if the individuals
involved agree to a particular scheme the effect of the statute is nullified.
Finally, regardless of what transpires, the rights of the surviving
spouse are subject to those of any income beneficiary whose interest in
income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to death.7 9
SECTION 8
It is in section 8 that the power to take against the testator's will 0 is
given and a statutory share provided.8 1 Of course, here an agreement
73. Elliott's Estate, 312, Pa. 493, 498, 167 A. 289, 291 (1933) stated: "A gift causa mortis
differs from other gifts only in that it is made when the donor believes he is about to die,
and is revocable should he survive."
74. BvaGY, supra note 9, at 5857.
75. Rynier Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A. 2d 736 (1943).
76. Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215, 28 A. 1113 (1894).
77. Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 580, 173 A. 303, 304 (1934) stated the determinative
factors of an antenuptial agreement. "For their validity antenuptial contracts depend upon
the presence of one of two factors: A reasonable provision for the wife, or, in the absence
of such provision, a full and fair disclosure to the wife of the husband's worth."
78. Fennell's Estate, 207 Pa. 309, 56 A. 875 (1904). This court held that where a post
nuptial agreement is reasonable and entered into with full knowledge of the facts and for
an adequate consideration it will be upheld.
79. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 11, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 301.11 (Supp. 1970).
80. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89 § 8, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 180.8(a) (Supp. 1970).
81. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89, § 8, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 180.8(b) (Supp. 1970).
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between the husband and wife may provide for some other disposition
of the estate.82 These agreements are construed strictly because the basic
policy behind this statute is the protection of the spouse.88
One of the first problems arises with partial intestacy.The question
presented may be stated as follows: Does the surviving spouse by ac-
cepting the will acquiese in the testamentary scheme and thereby pre-
clude himself from taking intestate property?s4 The answer is it will
only where "a fractional part of the whole estate is bequeathed in lieu
of dower... -"85 Where a partial intestacy exists, a surviving spouse who
elects to take against the will is not entitled to the $20,000 allowance
under the Intestate Act.8 6 When a spouse takes against the will his share
is set forth by section 8 of the Wills Act. However, in a situation where
decedent dies intestate the election by the surviving spouse to treat
section 11 conveyances as testamentary does not prohibit the spouse
from taking the allowance. 7
By taking against the will the surviving spouse loses the benefit of
provisions to pay funeral expenses8 if they are included in the will. This
is consistent with the general principle that where a spouse elects to take
against a will it is destroyed as to him.89
The next problem is the surviving spouse's rights in property aliened
without his joinder.90 It has been held that the wife can take under the
will and retain her dower in land conveyed without her joinder.9' This
has been described as the hardest case.
In such a case she is not permitted to claim a share of real estate
devised by the will to others. But if she is permitted to take both
her gift under the will and also an intestate share in real estate
82. Mahoney's Estate, 56 D. & C. 286 (1945).
83. Zeigler Estate, 381 Pa. 436, 113 A. 2d 271 (1955).
84. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 80, § 2, as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1.2 (Supp. 1970).
85. Thompson's Estate, 229 Pa. 542, 550, 79 A. 173, 176 (1911); Biddle Estate, 375, Pa.
189, 100 A. 2d 65 (1953); Forrestal's Estate, 10 D. & C. 152, 153 (1928) states: "The general
rule is that an election to take under a will is in lieu of the part of the estate as to which
there is a testacy, but not as to the part of the estate as to which there is an intestacy."
86. Martin Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 74 A. 2d 120 (1950); see also Act of April 24, 1947, P.L
80, § 2, as amended, PUInON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.2(3) (Supp. 1970) which provides:
"In case of partial intestacy, any amount received by the surviving spouse under the will
shall satisfy pro tanto the twenty thousand dollar allowance .
87. Hershey Estate (No. 2), 11 Fid. Rep. 122 (1960).
88. Mitchell's Estate, 79 Pa. Super, 208 (1922).
89. Kate's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925). Shaiman supra note 4, at 8. "However,
the electing spouse is permitted to accept an appointment as executrix, trustee, or guard-
ian of a minor's estate."
90. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 80, § 5, as amended, PuRDoN's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1.5 (Supp. 1970).
91. Borland v. Nichols, 12 Pa. 38 (1849).
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conveyed inter vivos, her rights against the transferee (who might
be an innocent purchaser for value) are greater than her rights
against devisees. 92
When the spouse takes against the will the argument set forth above is
not applicable because all are treated the same regardless of whether
they are devisees or transferees. Therefore, the result of allowing the
surviving spouse rights in property aliened without his joinder is easier
to justify.
When the spouse takes against the will the testamentary scheme may
be destroyed. The treatment of remainders becomes an immediate prob-
lem. The rule has been stated many times; generally remainders are
accelerated 3 unless there is an evident contrary intent.94 However,
where "by inevitable implication, as, for instance where the will by
itself fixes a definite time for distribution independent of the widow's
death,"' 95 this rule will not be followed.
Whenever remainders are accelerated oftentimes a hardship may be
imposed on other beneficiaries. 96 When this is the case "parts of the
estate may be sequestered,9 7 in accordance with equitable principles, for
the benefit of disappointed legatees and devisees. '9 8 Of course, "varying
testamentary provisions render it impossible to promulgate rules of
sequestration which will apply in every case." 99
CONCLUSION
Viewing these sections as complementary it is evident that the position
of the surviving spouse has been made more secure. The spouse is
92. BREGY, supra note 9, at 609.
93. "When the renounced interest is the only hindrance to the succeeding interest be-
coming forthwith a present interest, then acceleration .... causes such succeeding interest
to become forthwith a present interest." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 231, comment e at
964 (1936).
94. Id. Schmick Estate, 349 Pa. 65, 36 A. 2d 305 (1944).
95. Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 543, 101 A. 804, 806 (1917).
96. An example of such a situation is found in Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 144, 154
A. 387, 388 (1931). "Testator died leaving a widow and collateral heirs. His estate amounted
to nearly $1,500,000, of which, under the terms of the will, the residuary legatee would
have received about $900,000. The widow elected to take against the will, the effect of
which that the residuary legatee's share was reduced about $500,000, but none of the other
legatees was affected thereby." Testator's wife had a life estate in a $200,000 trust. On her
death $150,000 of the corpus was payable to the residue while $50,000 was to go to ap-
pointees. In this case the $50,000 was sequestered until the wife's death.
97. "The renounced interest is treated as if it were the subject matter of a trust to bejudicially administered to effectuate as nearly as may be possible, the testator's manifested
plan of disposition." RysTATzmENT OF PROPERTY § 234, comment a at 985 (1936).
98. Schmick Estate, 349, Pa. 65, 68, 36 A.2d 305, 307 (1944).
99. Id. at 69, 36 A. 2d at 307.
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protected by section 8 from exclusion by the will. The surviving spouse
may not be prevented from sharing in the estate of his spouse when she
retains certain controls over the property until death. While there are
devices available that permit a spouse to effectuate a desire to exclude
her spouse they are limited in number. That, "it is only the stupid
husband, who, against his wishes, would be forced to allow his wife to
share in his personalty,'1 00 is no longer necessarily accurate.
WILLIAM JAMES McKiM
100. Comment, Gifts of Personal Property as Limited by the Rights of the Wife, 5
U. Prrr. L. REv. 78, 87 (1939).
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